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Precautionary Constitutionalism in Ancient Athens 
Adriaan Lanni
* & Adrian Vermeule
** 
 
  The Athenian democracy developed striking institutions that, taken together and 
separately, have long engaged the attention of theorists in law, politics, and history.  We will 
offer a unifying account of the major institutions of the Athenian constitutional order, attempting 
both to put them in their best light and to provide criteria for evaluating their successes and 
failures.  Our account is that Athenian institutions are best understood as an illustration of 
precautionary constitutionalism: roughly, the idea that institutions should be designed to 
safeguard against political risks, limiting the downside and barring worst-case political scenarios, 
even at the price of  limiting the upside potential of the constitutional order.
1  We use this 
framework to illuminate some of the distinctive features of the Athenian democracy: selection of 
officials by lot, rotation of office, collegiality, ostracism, and the graphe paranomon  (the 
procedure for overturning an unconstitutional decree). 
  Under some circumstances, precautionary constitutionalism is a useful strategy of 
institutional design.  Under other circumstances, however, precautionary constitutionalism can 
go wrong in characteristic ways – by perversely exacerbating the very risks it seeks to prevent, 
by jeopardizing other values and thereby imposing excessive costs, or simply by creating futile 
precautions that fail the test of incentive-compatibility.
2  We evaluate the precautionary 
institutions of the Athenian democracy in this light, and suggest that some failed while others 
succeeded.  While selection by lot, rotation, and collegiality proved to be enduring and incentive-
compatible institutions, ostracism perversely exacerbated the risks of tyranny and political 
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1 For an analysis of precautionary constitutionalism, see Adrian Vermeule, Precautionary Principles in 
Constitutional Law, J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 2012 (advance access version)  
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domination it was intended to prevent, and the graphe paronomon collapsed into futility.  Given 
the limits of our sources and the resulting uncertainty about the performance of Athenian 
institutions, however, these judgments are inevitably tentative.    
  Part I defines precautionary constitutionalism and explains its characteristic features.   
Part II analyzes major Athenian institutions as precautions against political risks, especially 
tyranny and the excesses of democracy.  Part III examines the general conditions under which 
constitutional precautions succeed or fail.  Part IV evaluates Athenian institutions accordingly.  
A brief conclusion follows.   
I.  What is Precautionary Constitutionalism? 
  In ordinary subconstitutional risk regulation, a major set of debates involves 
“precautionary principles.”  There is a bewildering variety of such principles,
3 and the debates 
often bog down in issues of definition and in subtle differences between formulations.  Broadly 
speaking, however, the common theme is that precautionary principles place the burden of 
uncertainty on proponents of actions or technologies perceived to be risky.  This sort of approach 
implicates two dimensions: the timing of precautions and their stringency.  “On these sliding-
scale dimensions, regulation is more ‘precautionary’  when it intervenes earlier and/or more 
stringently to prevent uncertain future adverse consequences.”
4 
  If ordinary risks to health, safety and the environment pose first-order  problems  of 
optimal regulatory policy, political risks pose second-order problems that arise from the design 
of institutions, the allocation of decisionmaking authority among institutions, and the selection of 
officials to staff those institutions.  While the debate over precautionary principles is a recent one 
as applied to ordinary risks, it is a venerable one as applied to distinctively political risks.  With 
respect to such risks, a longstanding tradition in political and constitutional theory argues that the 
aim of institutional design should be precautionary rather than optimizing.  Rather than 
                                                 
3 Per Sandin, Dimensions of the Precautionary Principle, 5 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 889–907 
(1999). 
4 Jonathan B. Weiner, Precaution in a Multirisk World, in D. Paustenbach, ed., HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509–1531 (2002). 3 
attempting to select the best institutions or leaders, the argument runs, the aim should be to select 
the safest institutions or leaders.  Institutions should be designed in order to minimize downside 
risks and to prevent the occurrence of worst-case scenarios.  In this tradition, the political risks 
most often seen as requiring stringent safeguards are dictatorship and tyranny, in the sense of 
rule by one man; oligarchy or aristocratic rule; majoritarian tyranny and oppression of political 
or ethnic minorities; excessive centralization; and deprivation of property rights. 
  Theorists in this tradition have sometimes offered precautionary master principles for 
designing and evaluating the institutions of a constitutional order.  Perhaps the most famous 
claim of this sort is David Hume’s knavery principle: the maxim that “in contriving any system of 
government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought to 
be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest.”
5  Hume 
acknowledged that “it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics, which 
is false in fact.”  Not all men or officials are in fact knaves.  Yet Hume’s idea, at least as 
adumbrated by later theorists,
6 was that bad types (“knaves”) do more harm than good types do 
good, so that the constitutional order should build in a systematic skew towards preventing 
knavery or minimizing its harms. 
  Hume’s polity was only partly a representative-democratic one.  For recognizably modern 
democracies, the leading statement of precautionary constitutionalism was offered by Karl 
Popper, whose core idea in political theory was that democracy is best justified as a 
precautionary mechanism against tyrannous or incompetent leadership.  Popper’s “new approach” 
to the problem of politics was to “replace the question: Who should rule? by the new question: 
How can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented 
                                                 
5 David Hume, Of the Independency of Parliament. In ESSAYS, MORAL AND POLITICAL. Vol. 1. Edinburgh: A. 
Kincaid 84 (1742). 
6 See, e.g., Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, THE REASON OF RULES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 52, 54-59 (1985).  4 
from doing too much damage?”
7  The answer, for Popper, was democracy: “the principle of a 
democratic policy” is to “create, develop and protect political institutions for the avoidance of 
tyranny.”
8  In this light, Popper argued, the “equalitarian methods of democratic control, such as 
general elections and representative government,” amounted to “reasonably effective institutional 
safeguards against tyranny.”
9 
  There is a real question whether Popper identifies the right institutional safeguards, even 
assuming the validity of his master principle that institutions should be designed, above all, with 
a view to preventing tyranny.  As Bernard Manin has shown,
10 political theorists and political 
actors in the ancient world and in the Italian city-states of the Renaissance argued that elections 
themselves created a risk of aristocratic oligarchy, if not tyranny, in virtue of their tendency to 
select “the best” – who will often be the wealthiest or the most pedigreed.  On this view, the 
random mechanism of political selection by lot is a preferable, because more stringent, safeguard 
against oligarchy or tyranny.  We take up these issues in Part II, in the context of selection of 
office-holders by lot in the Athenian political system. 
For now, the important point is that whatever its merits, Popper’s precautionary approach 
to the constitutional order was not new at all.  Predecessors such as Hume are recognized 
antecedents, but we will claim that the precautionary tradition in constitutionalism goes back at 
least as far as Athens.  The next Part substantiates this claim. 
II. Athenian Precautions 
In this Part, we discuss three examples of precautionary constitutionalism in classical 
Athens: (1) provisions limiting executive magistrates’  power, such as the lot, rotation, and 
collegiality; (2) ostracism; and (3) the graphe paranomon, the procedure for overturning 
                                                 
7 See Karl Popper, The Paradoxes of Sovereignty, in POPPER SELECTIONS (David Miller ed.) 320 (1985) (emphasis 
in original; internal citation omitted). 
8 Popper, supra note, at 324. 
9 Id.  See also Judith N. Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in POLITICAL THOUGHT AND POLITICAL THINKERS (1998). 
10 See e.g., Hdt. 3.80 (add); for discussion of the lot as democratic, see HEADLAM, ELECTION BY LOT, 12-17;  
Richard C. Mulgan, Lot as a Democratic Device of Selection, 46.4 REVIEW OF POLITICS 539-560 (1984).  5 
unconstitutional decrees. The first two were aimed at protecting popular sovereignty by 
preventing any individual from accumulating too much power, or at worst, becoming a tyrant. 
The third was aimed at protecting popular sovereignty from itself, by preventing demagogues 
from misleading the Assembly into rash decisions.  
A.  Limiting Magistrates’ Influence: Selection by Lot, Rotation, and Collegiality 
In the ancient Greek world, selection of magistrates by lot was nearly synonymous with 
democracy.
11 One of the most important functions of the lot in the Athenian democratic structure 
was to prevent any individual magistrate from amassing too much power and thereby threatening 
the sovereignty of the popular Assembly. We argue that the lot, taken together with the 
principles of rotation and collegiality, operated as precautionary measures against individuals 
gaining too much influence.  
In the classical period, the vast majority of Athenian magistrates, about 1100 in all, were 
selected by lot for one-year terms.
12 The Boule (Council), which served as the executive body of 
the Assembly and was by far the most important magistracy, illustrates the Athenian 
commitment to lot and rotation.
13 The Council was comprised of 500 men chosen by lot, and was 
divided into 10 groups, or prytanies, of 50.
14 Each prytany took a turn serving as the executive 
committee of the Council for one-tenth of the year, and every day a new “president” (epistates) 
was selected by lot from among the 50 members of the current prytany.
15 During his day-long 
term in office, the epistates held the keys to the city’s store of money and acted as the head of 
state for communications with other city-states.
16 
                                                 
11 E.g. HERODOTUS, THE HISTORIES (Marincola trans. Penguin Books 2003), at  207 (Penguin 2003) [Hdt. 3.80]  
(“Under a government of the people a magistrate is appointed by lot”); ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (Sinclair trans. 
Penguin Books 1962), at 363 [Ar. Pol. 1317b17-1381a3] (identifying offices filled by lot as a feature of democracy).  
12 MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF DEMOSTHENES 230 (1991). 
13 For discussion of the operation of the Boule, see HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note -, at 247-265. 
14 ARISTOTLE, The Constitution of the Athenians  in ARISTOTLE AND XENOPHON ON DEMOCRACY AND OLIGARCHY 
185 (J.M. Moore trans., 1986)[Ar. Ath .Pol 43.2-3.]; HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note -, at 246-
250. 
15 Id. at 250. 
16 Id. 6 
While most magistrates were chosen by lot, a minority of positions that were deemed to 
require expertise
17 were chosen by election. The ten generals were the most prominent elected 
offices; the generals were also not subject to the principle of rotation or term limits.
18 Other 
elected offices included other military commanders, a few of the most important financial posts, 
the superintendant of the water supply, and other specialized jobs.
19  
Another important feature of the democracy was collegiality, that is, the diffusion of 
power among several magistrates.
20  In Athens, most magistrates served on boards, typically 
made up of ten officials. To provide a few examples, boards were assigned to oversee market 
trading, public works, state finance, court administration, and military operations.
21  Each 
member of the board generally had equal powers; there was no chairman, and presumably 
decisions were made by consensus, or, where necessary, majority vote.
22 Many of the elected 
officials, most notably the generals, also shared power on boards of ten and were thereby subject 
to the principle of collegiality.
23 
The notion of collegiality as a precaution against tyranny is straightforward,
24 but the 
idea that the lot and rotation were precautionary measures may not be as obvious. Although 
ancient sources do not provide a clear statement of the reasons for adopting the lot,
25 selection by 
lot is uniformly associated with democratic reforms, as opposed to election, which is considered 
aristocratic.
26 Selection by lot and the related concept of rotation in office likely had many 
purposes, including promoting popular and equal participation in government, reducing the risk 
                                                 
17 See XENOPHON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ATHENIANS,  in ARISTOTLE AND XENOPHON ON DEMOCRACY AND 
OLIGARCHY 37 (J.M. Moore trans., 1986)] [Xen. Ath.Pol. 1.2-3] (noting that Athens did not use the lot for posts 
requiring expertise, such as general (strategos) or commander of the cavalry). 
18 ARISTOTLE, The Constitution of the Athenians,  in ARISTOTLE AND XENOPHON ON DEMOCRACY AND OLIGARCHY 
201 (J.M. Moore trans., 1986)[Ar. Ath .Pol 61.1-7]. 
19 ARISTOTLE, The Constitution of the Athenians,  in ARISTOTLE AND XENOPHON ON DEMOCRACY AND OLIGARCHY 
185, 201 (J.M. Moore trans., 1986) [Ath. Pol. 43.1; 61.1-7]; for discussion, see HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN 
DEMOCRACY, supra note-, at 233-235. 
20 On collegiality in Athens, see HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note-, at 237-239. 
21 For discussion, see HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY  243. 
22HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 237-239. 
23 ARISTOTLE, The Constitution of the Athenians,  in ARISTOTLE AND XENOPHON ON DEMOCRACY AND OLIGARCHY 
201 (J.M. Moore trans., 1986)[Ar. Ath .Pol 61.1-7] 
24 E.g. HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note-, at  239. 
25 In fact, there is much debate about when the lot was introduced. For discussion, SEE JAMES HEADLAM, ELECTION 
BY LOT AT ATHENS 78-87 (1933); Mogens Herman Hansen, When was Selection by Lot of Magistrates Introduced in 
Athens? 41 CLASSICA ET MEDIAEVALIA 55-61 (1990).  
26 See supra note 11 (citing ancient sources); for discussion of the lot as democratic, see HEADLAM, ELECTION BY 
LOT, 12-17;  Richard C. Mulgan, Lot as a Democratic Device of Selection, 46.4 REVIEW OF POLITICS 539-560 
(1984).  7 
of bribery and corruption, and minimizing factionalism and conflict between elite groups.
27 But 
an equally important rationale for the lot and rotation was precautionary: as several scholars have 
pointed out, it prevented any individual executive official from gaining too much power, thereby 
insuring the sovereignty and supremacy of the Assembly.
28 Hansen has pointed out that it was 
the critics of democracy who traced the lot to democratic notions of equality; both the famous 
statement of democratic principles in Herodotus’  Persian Debate and book 6 of Aristotle’s 
Politics  appear to link the lot and limitations of magistrates’  power with preserving the 
sovereignty of the demos.
29 Headlam similarly describes the distinctly second-best nature of the 
lot: “ it was introduced … to prevent the executive officials from being too influential. . . . 
[m]ediocrity was its object, because this was the only means of insuring that not only the name 
but also the reality of power should be with the Assembly.”
30 It is important to emphasize that we 
are not arguing that the only, or even the chief, motivation for the introduction of the lot and 
rotation was the desire to limit magistrates’ power; we are simply highlighting this precautionary 
function of the lot as one of the many rationales for this institution.  We will evaluate how well 
these mechanisms worked as precautionary measures in Part IV. 
B. Ostracism 
One of the most distinctive institutions in the Athenian democracy was ostracism, a 
mechanism through which the people could vote to exile a prominent citizen for ten years. Our 
ancient sources suggest that the Athenians viewed ostracism as a precaution against tyranny and 
the danger of individual politicians gaining too much power. 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, 141 (bribery and corruption), 236 (factionalism); Mulgan, Lot as 
a Democratic Device 552 (expression of belief in equality, reducing the authority of executive officials, producing 
representative bodies, reducing factionalism).  For discussion of specific political motivations surrounding the 
introduction of the lot, see Robert J. Buck, The Reforms of 487 B.C. in the Selection of Archons 60.2 Classical 
Philology 96-101 (1965). 
28 HEADLAM, ELECTION BY LOT, 32; Mulgan, Lot as a Democratic Device 548; C. HIGNETT, A HISTORY OF THE 
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION TO THE END OF THE FIFTH CENTURY B.C. 230-231 (1952); HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN 
DEMOCRACY ,  236.  
29HERODOTUS, THE HISTORIES (Marincola trans. Penguin Books 2003), at 207 (Penguin 2003) [Hdt. 3.80]; 
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (Sinclair trans. Penguin Books 1962), at 363 [Ar. Pol. 1317b17-1381a3]; HANSEN, THE 
ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY,  at 236. 
30 HEADLAM, ELECTION BY LOT, 32.  8 
Each year, the Athenian assembly voted on whether to hold an ostracism.
31  If an 
ostracism was to be held, Athenians gathered in the agora to cast ballots by writing the name of a 
citizen on a potsherd.
32 As far as we know, there were no formal speeches or denunciations 
made, though politicians tried to influence votes informally by, for example, providing ready-
made potsherds inscribed with the name of their political rivals.
33 As long as the quorum of 6000 
votes was reached, then whoever had the most votes, however few that might be, was 
ostracized.
34 Ostracism was significantly less harsh than exile, because the ostracized individual 
could retain his land in Athens and return to it after the ten-year period had ended.
35  
Unlike most features of the Athenian constitution, ancient sources provide an explicit 
rationale for the institution of ostracism. Although the precise date is disputed,
36  Aristotle’s 
Constitution of the Athenians reports that Cleisthenes introduced ostracism as a measure against 
tyranny, and, in particular, to prevent Hipparchus from reinstating the Peisistratid tyranny.
37 In 
the Politics, Aristotle similarly describes ostracism as a mechanism for preventing any citizen 
from amassing too much power.
38  One scholar has suggested that the primary appeal of 
ostracism over, for example, Solon’s anti-tyranny law, was its precautionary nature: tyranny is a 
                                                 
31 R.K. SINCLAIR, DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION IN ATHENS 169-70 (1988). For general discussions of ostracism, 
SEE P.J. RHODES, A COMMENTARY ON THE ARISTOTELIAN ATHENAION POLITEIA 267-271 (1993); Antony 
Raubitschek, The Origin of Ostracism, 55.3AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ARCHAEOLOGY 221-229 (1951); Sara Forsdyke, 
Ostracism and Athenian Democracy, 19.2 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY 232-263 (2000); Donald Kagan, The Origin and 
Purposes of Ostracism, 30.4 HESPERIA 393-401 (1961).  
32 R.K. SINCLAIR, DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION IN ATHENS 169-70 (1988). 
33 Id.  
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 For a discussion of the debate, with references, see RHODES, COMMENTARY ON THE ATH.POL., supra note-, at 267-
269.  
37 ARISTOTLE, The Constitution of the Athenians  in ARISTOTLE AND XENOPHON ON DEMOCRACY AND OLIGARCHY 
165 (J.M. Moore trans., 1986)[Ar. Ath .Pol 22.1]; see also RHODES, COMMENTARY ON THE ATH.POL., supra note-, at 
269 (“On the purpose of ostracism there is general agreement in the sources: it was devised after the fall of the 
tyranny to prevent future tyrannies.”). It is important to note that some scholars argue that the purpose of ostracism 
was a different type of precaution: not to prevent tyranny, but to prevent factionalism by providing a peaceful 
resolution of conflict between political rivals. E.g. Forsdyke, Ostracism and Athenian Democracy, supra note -. at  
254-255. Space does not permit a full discussion of why we find this theory, though plausible, less convincing than 
the standard anti-tyranny account of ostracism. But if the anti-factionalism theory of ostracism is correct, then 
ostracism does not suffer from perversity as described in Part IV. Rather, under this view, the use of ostracism by 
politicians to eliminate their rivals was not a misuse of the institution at all, but evidence of its success in fulfilling 
its aims.  
38 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (Sinclair trans. Penguin Books 1962), at 213-214 [Ar. Pol. 1284a17-22]. For 
discussion, see RHODES, COMMENTARY ON ATH. POL., supra note-, at 167-71. 9 
crime “which should be prevented rather than punished,”
39 and ostracism permitted the removal 
of dangerous individuals before they became so powerful as to be beyond the reach of a tyranny 
prosecution.
40 It seems clear that ostracism was adopted not because it was viewed as an optimal 
institution—in fact, since no trial was held it clearly introduced a risk that the state would lose 
some of its most talented leaders for no reason—but as a precaution against the very real risk of a 
return to tyranny.  
As we will see in Part IV, from the beginning politicians used ostracism as a weapon 
against their rivals, thereby undermining the function of ostracism as a precaution against 
tyranny. Perhaps in part for this reason, ostracism fell into disuse by the last quarter of the fifth 
century.
41  
C. Graphe Paranomon 
  The graphe paranomon was a legal procedure for challenging legislation passed by the 
Athenian Assembly as paranomos (“contrary to law,” or “unconstitutional”). Although we do not 
have a contemporary account of the reasons for the creation of the graphe paranomon procedure, 
it is clear that this institution was intended and structured as a precaution against rash decision-
making by the popular Assembly, particularly imprudent actions taken under the influence of 
demagogues.  
  Under the graphe paranomon procedure, any male citizen could challenge a decree as 
paranomos, or unconstitutional.
42  There is some debate over whether a decree could be 
                                                 
39 Raubitshck, The Origin of Ostracism, supra note- at 225. 
40 On ostracism as a form of “prediction market” that aggregated opinions about which individual was most 
dangerous to the state, see JOSIAH OBER, DEMOCRACY AND KNOWLEDGE 160-161 (2008). 
41 R.K. SINCLAIR, DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION IN ATHENS 170 (1988) (noting that ostracism fell into disuse). 
42 The legal reforms at the end of the fifth century established a hierarchy between laws (nomoi) that proclaimed 
general and permanent higher norms of general application and time-limited decrees (psephismata); in theory, at 
least, no decree could contravene a law, and no new law could contradict an existing law unless the pre-existing law 
was simultaneously repealed. HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY  161-162. Following this reform, the graphe 
paranomon was limited to challenges to decrees, while a new procedure, the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai 
(“public procedure for introducing an unsuitable law”), was introduced for challenging new laws. Prior to the 
reforms, all legislation could be challenged under the graphe paranomon. For general discussion of the graphe 
paranomon procedure, see M.J. SUNDAHL, THE USE OF STATUTES IN THE SEVEN EXTANT GRAPHE PARANOMON AND 
GRAPHE NOMON ME EPITEDEION THEINAI SPEECHES, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (Brown University 2000); M.H. 10 
overturned where it did not contravene existing statute law but instead  violated general 
constitutional principles, or even where it simply was deemed to be contrary to the city’s 
interests.
43 A constitutional challenge would result in a day-long jury trial in which the sponsor 
of the legislation was charged with defending his  decree.
44  The typical jury included 501 
members, but in high-profile cases more jurors might be used.
45 Proposed legislation could be 
challenged either before or after it was enacted by the Assembly; in both cases, the legislation 
was suspended pending the outcome of the trial.
46 If the prosecution was successful, the decree 
was nullified and, if the challenge was initiated within a year, the defendant was subject to a 
punishment assessed by the jury, typically a fine.
47 If the jury upheld a decree that had already 
been duly enacted prior to being challenged, then the legislation became valid.
48 It seems that if 
in a graphe paranomon the jury upheld a decree that had been challenged prior to enactment, the 
decree automatically became valid even though the Assembly had never voted on the measure.
49  
  We do not know for certain when the graphe paranomon  was introduced. The first 
attested example is 415 B.C.,
50  and there is some reason to think that this institution was 
relatively new at this time.
51 The current leading, though necessarily speculative, accounts of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
HANSEN, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE’S COURT IN ATHENS IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C. AND THE PUBLIC 
ACTION AGAINST UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS (Odense 1974); H.J. WOLFF, ‘NORMENKONTROLLE’ UND 
GESETZESBEGRIFF IN DER ATTISCHEN DEMOKRATIE (Heidelberg 1970); for an overview of both the graphe 
paranomon and graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai procedures, see HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 205-
212. 
43 For discussion of this debate, see Adriaan Lanni, Judicial Review and the Athenian Constitution in M.H. HANSEN, 
ED.,  DEMOKRATIA ANCIENT AND MODERN 235, 238-240 (2010).  
44 Id.at 236-240.  
45 Id.  
46 Id.; M.H. Hansen, Graphe Paranomon Against Psephismata not yet Passed by the Ekklesia, 75-80. E. Carawan, 
The Trial of the Arginousai Generals and the Dawn of Judicial Review, 10 DIKE  36-37 (2007),  suggests that, at 
least in the fifth century, a decree could not be overturned after it was implemented.  
47 Adriaan Lanni, Judicial Review and the Athenian Constitution, 236-240; WOLFF, ‘NORMENKONTROLLE’, 9-10.   
Carawan, The Trial of the Arginusae Generals, 32-35 argues that the one-year time-limit on liability may not have 
been true of the fifth-century graphe paranomon.  
48 Lanni, Judicial Review and the Athenian Constitution, 236-240. 
49 M.H. Hansen, Graphe Paranomon Against Psephistmata Not Yet Passed; Presumably in the case of proposed 
laws upheld in a graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai, the measure would still need to be duly enacted through the 
nomothetai.  M.J. SUNDAHL, THE USE OF STATUTES , 19; M.H. Hansen, Athenian Nomothesia, 26 GREEK, ROMAN, 
& BYZANTINE STUD. 345, 360-370 (1985).  
50 Lanni, Judicial Review and the Athenian Constitution, supra note-, at  236 
51 See DOUGLAS MACDOWELL, ANDOCIDES, loc. Cit. 1.17 (1962) For discussion, with references to theories dating 
the institution to Solon, Ephialtes, and the late fifth century, see HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, 205; 
SUNDAHL, THE USE OF STATUTES, 24-26. 11 
introduction of the graphe paranomon both emphasize the precautionary nature of the institution. 
For Hansen, it is not coincidental that the graphe paranomon appears to have been introduced 
soon after the demise of ostracism: for him, the graphe paranomon replaced ostracism as the 
primary mechanism for preventing individual political leaders from gaining too much power 
over the people.
52 Wolff similarly viewed the graphe paranomon as a way to limit the ability of 
individual politicians to mislead the people.
53 But for Wolff, the key change toward the end of 
the fifth century was not the abandonment of ostracism, but the rise of a new type of politician 
after the death of Pericles. These politicians, criticized by conservatives as demagogues, tended 
to exercise their power exclusively as rhetores (public speakers in the Assembly), rather than as 
generals like Pericles who were subject to election and an accounting at the end of office. Under 
this theory, the graphe paranomon was introduced to provide some political accountability for 
demagogues and to limit the damage that could be done by them by providing a mechanism to 
overturn legislation taken in haste.
54  
  The graphe paranomon procedure, commonly compared to modern judicial review
55 or 
bicameralism,
56 is typically viewed by modern scholars as serving a precautionary function in 
the Athenian system. By requiring a fresh hearing on a different day, the graphe paranomon 
provided some safeguard against hasty or ill-advised legislation, particularly given the fear that 
skilled public speakers might mislead or whip the demos into a frenzy.
57 The Mytilenean affair 
of 427
58 may illustrate the deficiencies of Assembly decision-making that prompted the creation 
of the graphe paranomon. After being persuaded by Cleon, a demagogue, to destroy Mytilene 
because it had revolted against Athenian rule, the Athenians immediately thought better of their 
hasty decision. In that case, a second Assembly was called, and cooler heads prevailed, saving 
the city.
59  
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In addition to formalizing a procedure for a sober second look at legislation, the graphe 
paranomon procedures were more conducive to rational assessment than the Assembly. The 
court hearing itself insured that the legislation was examined for an entire day, and that both 
sides of the case were given a full airing by prepared speakers.
60 While politicians might try to 
pack the Assembly with supporters or influence votes taken by open vote in the Assembly, the 
random selection of jurors and the secret ballot insured that individual politicians could not 
influence the jurors judging the constitutionality of the legislation. Finally, although there was 
substantial overlap between the Assemblymen and the jurors, the two groups were not exactly 
the same: the jury was limited to men over thirty years old,
61 a significant difference in a society 
like Athens, where age was very strongly associated with wisdom and rationality,
62 and where 
the life expectancy at birth was roughly twenty-five years.
63  
In theory and structure, then, the graphe paranomon was a precautionary institution: it 
was not the preferred form of law-making because it circumvented the authority of the sovereign 
Assembly, but it was considered a necessary precaution against the dangers of demagogues and 
the resulting excesses of popular democracy. In Part IV we will evaluate the extent to which this 
precautionary institution succeeded.  
III.  Problems of Precautions 
  Under what conditions will precautionary rules and principles of constitutionalism 
succeed or fail, relative to their intended purposes or best justifications?  The issues are 
inevitably local and contextual; sometimes precautions succeed, sometimes they do not, and 
when they fail, they may fail in different ways and on different grounds.  Despite the local 
character of the issues, it is possible to offer some tentative generalizations about the problems of 
precautions.  This Part identifies three such general problems – futility, jeopardy, and perversity 
– and, conversely, outlines some conditions under which precautions will prove successful.  Part 
IV applies the analysis to Athenian institutions. 
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  To be clear, the following examples of futility, jeopardy and perversity problems are 
examples of arguments, not conclusions.  In any particular case, the arguments may or may not 
be ultimately correct, and the precautions at issue may or may not be desirable, all things 
considered.  We offer them to illustrate the typical pitfalls that precautionary constitutionalism 
must sidestep.
64   
A.  Futility and Commitment Problems 
  Adapting categories originally developed for other purposes by the intellectual historian 
Albert Hirschman,
65 we may distinguish futility, jeopardy and perversity as the main problems 
that precautions face.  Futility means that the precaution fails to accomplish its intended purposes 
(or the purposes that put it in its best light), simply because the precaution is inefficacious.  As 
relevant here, the most important form of futility is a commitment problem, in the economic 
sense.  Although enacted or created at Time 1 to bind or constrain decisions at Time 2, the 
precaution fails to stick; when Time 2 arrives, the precaution is undone by those it was supposed 
to constrain.   
Here the key problem is lack of incentive-compatibility: crucial actors at Time 2 lack 
adequate incentives to enforce the precaution enacted at Time 1.  In the case of ordinary 
subconstitutional commitments, such as contracts, there is an external institution such as a court 
system that enforces the commitment.  The parties can strike a deal that prevents either of them 
from reneging ex post, and the availability of this external enforcer make the contracting parties 
better off ex ante.  In constitutional settings, however, the problem is far more severe.  Putting 
aside international institutions, there is no actor external to society who can enforce the 
commitment through coercive law.
66  The consequence is that political actors must fall back 
upon fragile mechanisms of decentralized enforcement, such as repeat-play and tit-for-tat 
cooperation.
67  Such mechanisms, however, are fragile because there are usually multiple 
equilibria – if others will not contribute to enforcement of the constitutional rules, then each 
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actor has no incentive to do so – and because a Time 1 commitment will come unstuck altogether 
if no one desires to enforce it at Time 2. 
  In contemporary constitutional law,
68  an example is constitutional protection of free 
speech.  A standard theory of free speech, the “pathological perspective,”
69  appeals to the 
desirability of precautionary commitments against majoritarian oppression of dissent, caused by 
political panic or other collective pathologies.  On this approach, some constitutional rulemaker 
– a framer or a constitutional court – may attempt to lay down, at Time 1,  speech-protecting 
rules that aim to institutionalize precautions against pathological action at Time 2.  The problem 
is that when Time 2 actually arrives, then-extant actors may lack any incentive to enforce the 
speech-protective commitment in their current circumstances.  Judges, for example, may 
themselves be caught up in the passions of the moment and not only buckle to the majority’s 
demands for oppression, but actually embrace them; a review of judicial protection for free 
speech in wartime argues that this is a common denouement.
70  Where this occurs, the Time 1 
precaution proves futile. 
B.  Countervailing Risks: Jeopardy and Perversity 
  In the futility case, a precaution is ineffectual.  In other cases, a precaution is effectual but 
bad.  In general, this can happen because of countervailing risks.  While the precaution focuses 
on a target risk, the precaution may neglect other types of risks, or the precaution may itself 
exacerbate the very risk it aims to prevent.  Where the countervailing risk is different than the 
target risk, we will call the issue one of jeopardy; where the countervailing risk is the same as the 
target risk, so that the precaution actually operates at cross-purposes to itself, we will call the 
issue one of perversity.   
Jeopardy.  Jeopardy problems are conceptually straightforward, although the causal 
mechanisms that produce jeopardy differ from case to case.  The logic of jeopardy is simply that 
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taking precautions to reduce a target risk may create or exacerbate a countervailing risk.  Where 
the latter effect is particularly severe, precautions against the target risk may make things worse 
rather than better overall.  The costs of precautions may exceed their benefits, using “costs” and 
“benefits” in a loose and informal consequentialist sense, rather than in the technical sense of 
cost-benefit analysis that defines costs and benefits in terms of monetized willingness to pay or 
accept. 
In modern (post-Enlightenment) constitutional theory, jeopardy arguments appear at both 
the macro-level of the whole constitution and at the micro-level of particular constitutional rules 
and institutions.  At the macro-level, Federalist 41 invoked jeopardy to rebut the Antifederalist 
concern that a strong national government would “abuse” its powers.  Publius’ straightforwardly 
consequentialist response was that a strong national government would help to produce domestic 
peace and social welfare, so that stringent precautions against governmental abuse would forego 
too many independent benefits:  
[T]he choice must always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at least of the GREATER, not 
the PERFECT, good; and … in every political institution, a power to advance the public 
happiness involves a discretion which may be misapplied and abused.
71 
The micro-level is illustrated by criticisms of the reasonable doubt rule. In its classic 
Blackstonian formulation,
72 the rule posits that it is better for ten guilty men to go free than for 
one innocent to be convicted, and thus represents a stringent precaution against erroneous 
convictions.  The critics, however, urge that discharging the guilty in high ratios is itself an error 
that creates unacceptable collateral risks of other crimes to innocent third parties.
73  The higher 
the costs of that countervailing risk, the lower the ratio of erroneous acquittals to erroneous 
convictions should be. 
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Perversity.  Perversity problems arise when the precaution itself exacerbates the target 
risk, rather than a separate countervailing risk; in such cases, the precaution may prove self-
defeating.  Perversity problems afflict a range of precautions in modern liberal constitutionalism.  
An example from the founding era in the United States involves standing armies – a central 
thread of debate over the constitution proposed at Philadelphia. 
The draft constitution authorized Congress to create armed forces, subject only to the 
constraint that military appropriations must be renewed every second year.
74  Antifederalists 
argued that these rules contained insufficient precautions against the risk that a President or other 
political leader might use a standing army to crush popular liberty and assume dictatorial powers.  
Hamilton’s Federalist 8 argued at length that the precautions desired by the Antifederalists would 
have perverse effects, exacerbating rather than reducing the dangers to political liberty.  Absent a 
powerful national government capable of quelling conflict among states, the result might well be 
a Europeanization of the North American continent, in which regional military powers would 
engage in ongoing struggle.  Such a development would risk producing a multitude of standing 
armies at the state level and even a multitude of military dictatorships, with worse consequences 
for political liberty overall – perversely threatening the very value that the Antifederalists aimed 
to protect.
75  
In the case of standing armies, the precautions the Antifederalists desired were never 
adopted, so Hamilton’s argument was never put to the test.
76  Yet actual precautions have also 
faced perversity objections.  In free-speech cases involving subversive organizations such as the 
Communist Party, precautionary arguments about the dangers to liberty of suppressing political 
speech have been met with the rejoinder that if the government falls to internal enemies, all 
liberties, including free speech itself, will fall as well.  As Chief Justice Vinson put the argument, 
writing for the Court in Dennis v. United States,
77  
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[o]verthrow of the Government by force and violence is certainly a substantial enough 
interest for the Government to limit speech.  Indeed, this is the ultimate value of any 
society, for if a society cannot protect its very structure from armed internal attack, it 
must follow that no subordinate value can be protected.
78     
C.  Successful Precautions 
So far we have given examples of several ways in which constitutional precautions can go 
wrong.  Yet we do not mean to suggest that any and all constitutional precautions are undesirable 
– an incoherent claim in any event, for a major function of constitutions is to safeguard the polity 
against political risks.  Rather, our suggestion is that constitutional rulemakers can and should 
design optimal precautions.  By that we mean precautions that take into account all relevant 
risks, both target risks and countervailing risks, and that provide or at least rely upon incentive-
compatible mechanisms for their own enforcement.  By employing “mature”
79 and well-rounded 
precautions of this sort, constitutional rulemakers can and do improve the welfare of relevant 
populations. 
A conspicuous example of a well-designed precaution in American constitutional law is the 
Incompatibility Clause, which bars simultaneous service in the legislative and executive 
branches.
80  Conditional on accepting the basic decision behind the Clause – the Philadelphia 
Convention’s choice of independent legislative and executive institutions, as opposed to a 
parliamentary system – the Clause amounts to a precaution against the risk that one branch will 
swallow the other by means of personnel who hold dual offices.  Its clarity and simplicity have 
made it easy to enforce; subsequent actors have in fact honored it; and experience since the 
founding has not disclosed serious countervailing costs and risks.  To be sure, the Clause does 
not at all address the separate problem that political parties may in effect temporarily unite the 
branches by controlling personnel in both, but that is a far larger problem occurring in many 
other settings as well,
81 and it was not the evil that the Clause was designed to address. The 
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framers lacked the foresight to take precautions against the risk of partisan collusion across 
branches, assuming it is a risk, but that does not show any failure of the precaution they did take, 
against the risk they did perceive. 
Overall, successful precautions are those that (1) derive from a mature, even-handed 
consideration of all relevant risks, both these prevented and those created by the precautions; and 
(2) rest upon enforcement mechanisms that are compatible with the ex post incentives of the 
actors whose action is necessary if adequate enforcement is to occur.  The problems that we have 
identified, in other words, are pitfalls into which constitutional rulemakers can stumble, but it is 
not written in the nature of things that all precautions must fail.  As we will see in Part IV, in the 
Athenian case, some precautions failed, while others succeeded, in ways that illuminate both the 
promise and the problems of precautionary constitutionalism. 
IV. Evaluating Athenian Precautions  
In this Part, we evaluate each of the Athenian precautions discussed above in terms of the 
potential pitfalls of precautionary institutions. Ostracism perversely increased the risk of tyranny 
and the graphe paranomon was ineffective. We argue that the lot, rotation, and collegiality 
introduced significant countervailing risks in the form of incompetence and inefficiency, but 
were nevertheless successful precautions, all things considered. 
A. Ostracism and Perversity 
The Athenian practice of ostracism may illustrate the problem of perversity. That is, in some 
cases ostracism may have actually exacerbated, rather than diminished, the risk of tyranny and 
accumulation of power by one individual. From the beginning, prominent politicians used 
ostracism to get their rivals expelled from the city, thereby concentrating power in even fewer 
individuals at the top.
82 
It appears that Themistocles successfully pushed to have several of his rivals ostracized in the 
480s.
83  Their absence helped cement his power as the most powerful Athenian politician in this 
period.
84 Early in his career, Pericles similarly used ostracism to have his main rival, Cimon, 
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expelled.
85 The last attested case of ostracism, from around 416, provides another example of 
how ostracism could be self-defeating: in that year, a politician who was widely acknowledged 
not to be a threat was ostracized because two more prominent politicians teamed up against 
him.
86 Perhaps in part because Themistocles and Pericles were great leaders, we seldom think of 
them as having overstepped their bounds. But they were anomalies in the Athenian constitution, 
and for better or worse ostracism did not limit them
87 so much as it limited, or rather eliminated, 
several of their rivals.   
B. The Graphe Paranomon and Futility 
The failure of the graphe paranomon procedure to prevent what is likely the most disastrous 
decision of the Athenian democracy—the condemnation of the Arginusae generals
88—may 
illustrate the problem of futility and commitment described earlier.
89  The generals in charge of 
the naval victory at Arginusae in 406 B.C. were criticized for failing to rescue the shipwrecked 
sailors after the battle, despite a storm that prevented the rescue effort.
90 Kallixenos introduced a 
decree in the Assembly calling for the Athenians to decide on the guilt of the eight accused 
generals in a single vote during the current Assembly meeting.
91 Euryptolemos challenged the 
decree as unconstitutional, apparently on the grounds that it violated the generals’ right to a trial, 
and to an individual assessment of guilt.
92 According to Xenophon’s account, Euryptolemos was 
brow-beaten by the mob into dropping his constitutional challenge. The crowd (plethos) in the 
Assembly exclaimed “that it is shocking not to let the people do whatever they wish,”
93 and one 
citizen proposed that if Euryptolemos did not drop his challenge he should be tried by the same 
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vote as the generals.
94 Bowing to the popular pressure, Euryptolemos dropped his challenge, and 
instead made a counterproposal suggesting a trial, which was defeated.
95 The eight generals were 
condemned, and the six that were present were put to death.
96 This act deprived Athens of some 
of its most experienced generals at a critical time in the war with Sparta, and is commonly cited 
as a contributing factor in Athens’ eventual defeat.
97  
The Arginusae affair arguably illustrates a classic commitment problem that rendered the 
precautionary procedure ineffective: the Assembly apparently was not willing to be constrained 
by the graphe paranomon procedure that had been set up precisely to prevent such a rash 
decision. Nevertheless, it is interesting to speculate about what would have happened if 
Euryptolemos had been a little more persistent.  Despite the shouts and threats from the crowd, it 
is not at all clear from Xenophon’s account that the Assembly would have refused to table the 
vote if Euryptolemos had forced the issue; in fact, the ultimate vote on whether to have a trial 
nearly passed.
98  If Euryptolemos had declined to withdraw his motion for a constitutional trial, 
it is entirely possible that a trial would have been held and that the graphe paranomon jurors 
would have overturned the decree to condemn the generals.  So one wonders to what degree the 
Arginusae affair illustrates an inherent defect in the graphe paranomon (i.e., that in extreme 
cases the Assembly could simply ignore a bona fide motion to empanel a jury to hear the 
constitutional question), as opposed merely to a loss of nerve by Euryptolemos.  The 
commitment problem in the Arginusae affair was in any event somewhat different from modern 
constitutional commitment problems.  In the Arginusae affair, the Athenians blocked the 
precautionary institution, here the jury, from being engaged at all, while in modern contexts 
judicial review typically does occur, but in making their rulings judges may not be willing to be 
constrained by constitutional rules.    
Yet even allowing for these caveats, the Arginusae affair shows the limits of the graphe 
paranomon:  the decree to condemn the generals was at least arguably a departure from the 
Athenian constitution; at a minimum Euryptolemos brought this to the Assembly’s attention yet 
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no jury was empaneled; and had a jury been empaneled to think over the issue there was a 
reasonable chance they would have reversed a decision that ultimately had disastrous 
consequences for Athens.  The affair thus illustrates a chief design defect:  there was no 
safeguard to protect someone making a graphe paranomon motion from popular retaliation, and 
no institution external to the Assembly to guarantee the jurisdiction of a graphe paranomon jury 
once it was properly invoked.   
This does not mean that graphe paranomon was also ineffective in less highly charged 
situations; for this we have insufficient evidence to make a conclusive judgment,
99 and it is quite 
possible that any precaution of this type can only have helped prevent some of the rashness 
inherent in a democracy as radical as Athens.’  But the evidence we do have suggests that this 
precaution failed to serve its purpose at a critical juncture in the city’s history. 
C.  Lot, Rotation, and Collegiality: Problems of Jeopardy 
The trio of precautionary institutions aimed at limiting executive power—selection by lot, 
rotation, and collegiality—worked in the sense that individual Athenian officials were not able to 
amass significant power or to challenge the Assembly’s sovereignty, let alone threaten tyranny. 
Athenian politicians could not implement policies through executive offices; they had to 
persuade the people in the Assembly to adopt each of their proposals.
100 While these institutions 
may have succeeded in preventing their target risk of tyranny, they also introduced other risks 
into the system, namely incompetence and inefficiency. This is not to say that these 
countervailing risks necessarily outweighed the risk of tyranny. In fact, while we do not aim to 
offer a comprehensive evaluation of the success of the Athenian democracy, a strong argument 
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can be made that the Athenian approach toward executive offices functioned well, and in this 
sense that these institutions were successful, possibly even optimal, precautions.  
Selection by lot, rotation, and collegiality illustrate the problem of jeopardy. Selection of 
officers by lot distributes political power throughout the citizen population, reducing the risk that 
any individual citizen will accumulate significant influence. At the same time, electing 
magistrates at random rather than based on qualifications increases the risk that the magistrates 
chosen will be incompetent or lack specific skills or knowledge that are useful in performing 
their duties.
101 Annual rotation in office insured that a magistrate, once selected, could not amass 
power over a period of time, but also presented the risk that magistrates would not be able to 
learn from their mistakes and become more effective as they gained experience. Collegiality 
distributed power among the various members of the board, preventing any one officer from 
gaining too much influence, but could also introduce inefficiency. Disagreements among board 
members could cause delay or even inconsistency if board members carried out their duties 
differently; these problems may have been particularly acute in military affairs.
102  Under lot, 
rotation and collegiality, two of Popper’s precautionary arguments for democratic institutions – 
weeding out tyrannous leaders, and weeding out incompetent ones
103 – are substitutes rather than 
complements, trading off against one another rather than working hand in hand. 
Did the countervailing risks of incompetence and inefficiency outweigh the advantages of 
these precautionary institutions? It is impossible to answer this question with any certainty or 
objectivity; it touches on a very old debate about how well democracy worked in Athens and a 
more general debate about how important it is for the trains to run on time. Athens took the 
precaution against tyranny to an extreme, with executive power entrusted to ad hoc teams of 
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amateurs for nearly all offices.  This has made Athens notorious down the ages,
104 but it is 
undeniable that executive power was wielded without the gross lapses that modern lawyers 
might see as the inevitable outcome of such amateurism.
105 In fact, according to one influential 
modern account, the amateurism of the Athenian democracy actually fostered efficient and 
effective government by promoting the use of social networks, teamwork, and other mechanisms 
for organizing and deploying useful knowledge dispersed among the population.
  In any case, 
any disadvantages associated with Athens’  executive institutions were not severe enough to 
prevent Athens from achieving extraordinary success in both military and economic terms, at 
least for a time.
106 
Conclusion 
      Ancient Athens offers an interesting case of a precautionary constitutional order, precisely 
because its precautions were so extreme.  In an ostracism, potential tyrants could be exiled for 
ten years by the vote of a plurality, without any particular factual finding in support.  In the 
graphe paranomon, allegedly unconstitutional or irregular legislation could be referred by any 
member of the Assembly to a popular jury for approval or rejection.  And of course most 
executive posts were held by a rotating group of amateurs selected by lot.  These precautions 
were plagued by some of the problems endemic to precautions generally.  Thus, ostracism was 
supposed to be a tool for the demos to get rid of dominant personalities --  but instead the 
dominant personalities, such as Pericles and Themistocles, used it to get rid of their adversaries.  
The graphe paranomon was supposed to be a safeguard against inflamed popular passions, but in 
at least one key instance this very same passion arguably prevented its deployment.  And the 
decision to place executive power in the hands of randomly-selected citizens created at least a 
risk of mismanagement. And yet, the Athenians’  extreme brand of precautionary 
constitutionalism was surprisingly successful. Thanks to Thucydides
107  and other critics of 
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democracy,
108 we seldom notice that (apart from two brief, externally imposed interruptions) this 
radical system endured for nearly 200 years, and was ended only by what was essentially a force 
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